# APT security hardening baseline

- Canonical source: GitPeji `peji/Alta-Proxy-Tool`
- Starting commit: `a80074ac57b7a4517837b5d95754f5e6433df3ac`
- Branch: `hardening/security-foundation`
- Original review: `/home/peji/.hermes/reports/alta-proxy-tool-full-review-2026-08-19.md`
- Implementation plan: `docs/plans/2026-08-19-apt-security-foundation.md`
- Starting package version: `1.0.0`
- Starting audit: 25 findings (1 critical, 22 high, 2 moderate); production-only audit 3 findings (2 high, 1 moderate)
- Starting release state: split release hosting, no application CI, unsafe unsigned updater, no automated tests

## Guardrails

- GitPeji only; alternate-host remote removed.
- Production Tool Hub and existing downloads remain unchanged.
- Synthetic sentinel credentials only in tests.
- Work remains on the isolated hardening branch until review gates pass.
- No feature additions until Critical/Important security closure.

## Accepted passwordless proxy exception

Zac explicitly requires the paired-extension **Connect → select camera → Start Proxy** flow without re-entering Alta credentials. The external `aware-cam-proxy.exe` helper supports cookie authentication only through `-k`; it exposes no stdin, named-pipe, environment-variable, or credential-file interface. APT therefore passes the validated main-owned session directly to the fixed helper as one argv value. This exception remains bounded by direct `shell: false` spawn, trusted-device allowlisting, no renderer/IPC credential parameter, no logs/files/shells, redacted launch errors, safe tracked metadata, and synthetic regression tests.